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ARGUMENT 
PLAIN ERROR HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY APPROPRIATELY ON 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF RELATIVE TO SELF-DEFENSE 
A. Plain Error is Evident 
The State argues that the jury instructions given in this case were entirely 
adequate given that the jury was instructed of the State's burden of proof generally as to the 
elements of the offense, and that the defendant is never obligated to prove his innocence. 
However, in looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the jury's questions and 
the difficulty it was having as it related to reasonable doubt and self-defense, the jury 
instructions here were insufficient. It is clear that at the time of Appellant's trial, the 
Supreme Court had decided in State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), that where self-
defense is raised, general instructions on the State's burden of proof are insufficient. Id. at 
696. In other words, a specific instruction informing the jury that the State still maintains the 
obligation of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt is essential. 
As applied to the instant facts, the Supreme Court's rationale in Torres is 
particularly critical. The Court noted that "it seems neither fair nor necessary to expect or 
require the jury to go through such a tortuous process when that result could have been 
achieved by giving the defendant's requested instruction." Id. In light of the difficulty the 
jury was having in this case, as evidenced by its questions to the trial court, this situation 
could have easily been remedied by an instruction indicating the State's burden to disprove 
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Contrary to the State's contention, the law in State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 
(Utah 1985), does not change the outcome. The instruction that the Supreme Court held 
constituted a valid statement of the law is as follows: 
In other words, the burden of proof remains upon the State throughout 
the trial to show each and every necessary element to constitute the offense 
charged, and at no point in the proceedings does such burden shift; and if 
upon the whole of the evidence, including that produced by the defendant, or 
the circumstances in justification brought forth by him, or otherwise shown 
in evidence, the jury entertains a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt 
of any element necessary to constitute the charged defense or one included 
therein, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. 
Id. at 215. However, the Court in Knoll went on to state that "the trial court made clear in 
its instructions that the defendant had no burden to adduce evidence of self-defense . . . 
[and] that the burden of proof remained on the prosecution throughout the case." Id. What 
is critically distinguishable in the instant case, is the instructions the jury received before 
deliberating fell far short of what was approved in Knoll Instruction 15 merely stated the 
burden of proof that lies with the State and the concept of reasonable doubt. Nowhere is 
there instruction given anywhere in the instant case that resembles the consideration of the 
State's burden in conjunction with "the whole of the evidence, including that produced by 
the defendant." Id. Furthermore, the trial court gave the jury additional instructions after it 
returned with questions which did anything but clear up the confusion or adequately instruct 
as to the State's burden - as opposed to what was sanctioned in the Knoll instructions. The 
trial court repeatedly stated that if the jury determines self-defense existed then the shooting 
was not unlawfiil.(R.724-726). Again, there was not clarification relative to the State's 
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burden. The State incorrectly analogizes the instant case with Knoll given that the 
instructions there were far more substantial than what the jury was provided in this case. 
The State also relies upon the trial court's attempt to assist the jury in its 
confusion during deliberations, as further evidence that the jury was properly instructed. 
Appellant disagrees. The trial court erroneously left the impression with the jury that 
Appellant maintained some burden of proving self defense by stating that, "if [the jury] finds 
from the evidence that self-defense exists then the shooting was legally justified and not 
unlawful. If they find - if they find that self-defense does not exist then the shooting was 
unlawful and without legal justification." R. at 722. Additionally, the trial court stated, "[i]f 
you determine self-defense in this case then the verdict is not guilty." R. at 726. Neither of 
these explanations by the trial court accurately reflect the notion that Appellant has no 
burden in this regard, and leaves the impression that Appellant must show whether self-
defense exists or not, rather than the constitutionally appropriate standard that the State must 
disprove that self-defense exists beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The Law at the Time of Trial was not Ambiguous 
The State contends that after the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the law became ambiguous as stated in Torres and whether an 
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instruction regarding the State's burden of proof relative to self-defense is required. 
However, the issue of the burden of proof and self-defense the court decided in Dunn related 
to counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to specifically request such an instruction. What the 
Dunn court stated was that given the instructions as a whole, the defendant could not show 
prejudice. In other words, the judge's failure to specifically instruct the jury on the State's 
burden relative to an affirmative defense would not have produced a more favorable result. 
Id. at 1229. The second prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 
2052 (1984), ineffectiveness showing is where the Supreme Court placed its reliance in 
affirming the jury instructions given in that case. 
Appellant submits that the Supreme Court in Dunn did not muddy the waters 
as the State claims, but merely held that the jury instructions given in that case and the facts 
presented, which showed defendant's intent to kill, would not have resulted in a more 
favorable outcome had the jury been instructed as to the State's burden relative to his 
affirmative defense of compulsion. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228-29. The opinion in Dunn seems 
to imply that the failure to have such a jury instruction on the State's burden relative to an 
affirmative defense is error, but that under the circumstances of that case, the outcome would 
not have been different. In referring to the Torres decision, the court re-iterated that: 
. . . a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction informing the jury 'that 
the defendant had no particular burden of proof but was entitled to an 
acquittal if there was any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the offense.' 
[citations omitted] However, even if this language is clear enough to establish 
that Dunn's trial counsel fell below the standard of reasonable professional 
assistance by failing to request the contested instruction, we cannot say that 
but for the error, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have 
been more favorable to him. 
Id. at 1229. This language in Dunn does not create the ambiguity that the State presents and 
therefore, the trial court did commit plain error by not instructing the jury as to the State's 
burden concerning self-defense, which was clear at the time pursuant to prior precedent. 
C Where the State did not Object to the Self-Defense Instructions Below, 
the Issue that the Trial Court Should Never Have Instructed on Self 
Defense is Waived 
The State argues that the trial court erred in even instructing the jury relative 
to self-defense issues at all, therefore any failure of the trial court to instruct on the burden 
was not prejudicial. See State's Brief at Point I,C (p. 18). When the trial court inquired of 
both parties as to exceptions to the jury instructions, the State indicated it was "satisfied with 
the instructions" and that there were no issues with regard to the instructions. (R. 653,655). 
The State now argues that Appellant could not have been prejudiced by the trial court's 
failure to properly instruct on the burden to disprove self-defense, because Appellant was 
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never entitled to self-defense instructions as a matter of law. See State's Brief at 18. Because 
no exception to the self-defense instructions was made below, that issue is waived and 
cannot be raised by the State.1 
Although this argument is waived by the State, Appellant addresses the 
substance of the State's claim that he had no right to self-defense in this case regardless of 
whether the instructions were proper or not. The cases the State relies upon of State v. 
Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), and State v. Gonzales, 545 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975), both 
contain factual scenarios different from the instant case. In both Starks and Gonzales, the 
evidence at trial clearly supported that both victims were retreating from the defendants at 
the time their fatal shots were inflicted. Id. Here, there was ample evidence to contradict the 
claim that "Nacho" was retreating from the situation. Further, in State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 
554 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), also relied upon by the State, there was clear evidence that the 
defendant escalated the fight when she returned to combat with the victim, armed with a 
1
 State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such claims on appeal); State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 
(Utah 1996)(issues not raised before trial court are usually waived and cannot be raised 
on appeal); State v. Wodskow, 896 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(State did not raise 
issue below and therefore it was not preserved, and appellate court need not consider it 
when State has not argued "exceptional circumstances."); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)(court will generally not consider an issues raised for the first time 
on appeal). 
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knife. Id. Again, these facts are distinguishable from the instant case where Appellant 
reasonably believed the victim to be pulling out a gun and responded with like force. In 
addition, various cases the State cites for support that there can be no error in the instructions 
because Appellant was not entitled to self-defense instructions in the first place, are cases 
where no self-defense instructions were given because the defendant did not present 
sufficient evidence of such.2 
Furthermore, the State has ignored the proposition that "the jury may acquit 
even though the evidence of self-defense fell 'far short of establishing the justification or 
excuse by a preponderance of the evidence upon the subject.'" State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 
214 (Utah 1985), citing State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169,181,120 P. 497, 502 (1911). The State 
falls victim to the same problem argued by Appellant herein, which is that the defendant 
does not need to demonstrate self-defense existed, before any error can be shown. 
2
 See State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I. 1995)(no error in denying self-
defense instructions where there was "not one scintilla of evidence that defendant acted 
in a self-defensive posture"); State v. Bowman, 869 S.W.2d 901, 902-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994)(defendant not entitled to self-defense instruction where victim was fleeing from 
fight and defendant chased him down and shot him); People v. Pabon, 483 N.Y.S.2d 92 
(App. Div. 1984)(self-defense instructions refused based upon facts that victim ran from 
fight and defendant gave chase, as well as defendant's claim that death was accident). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse 
his conviction and/or grant him a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 2000. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
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